The best test of the strength of a legal principle is its ability to withstand the most arduous weight under the most adverse circumstances. In the case of Omer Ninham, the reprehensible acts of a 14-year-old boy bear down relentlessly like an immeasurable pressure on the Eighth Amendment, straining it to its limits. On September 24, 1998, when Omer Ninham was 14 years old, he, along with four other juvenile accomplices of about the same age, encountered 13-year-old Zong Vang, who was on his way to the grocery store to run an errand for his brother. One of Ninham's accomplices, 13-year-old Richard Crapeau, wanted to instigate a fight. The boys targeted Vang, verbally taunting him until the momentum of the encounter escalated into a physical attack. "Ninham punched Vang, knocking him down."
2 Vang got to his feet and ran from the four, who pursued him. Upon reaching Vang, Crapeau punched him in the face, even as Vang repeatedly begged to know why they were doing this to him, pleading with them to stop. The boys continued to punch and push Vang until they grabbed him and held him over the wall of a parking structure. Vang was suspended over the 45-foot drop when Crapeau released his hold on Vang's feet and told Ninham to "[d]rop him." 3 "Ninham let go of Vang's wrists, and in Crapeau's words, Vang 'just sailed out over the wall. '" 4 Vang died due to the "craniocerebral trauma" from the fall. 5 The four ran from the scene. 6 This Note starts from the premise that since Graham v. Florida, 7 juvenile life without parole (JLWOP) is a violation of the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment (CUP), regardless of offense. Even in the most heinous, atrocious, and cruel cases the imposition of life without parole (LWOP) for a juvenile offender is a violation of the Constitution. The basis of this principle rests primarily on the de facto and de jure diminished culpability of juveniles as deter- 3 Id. 4 Id. 5 Id. at 458. 6 Id. 7 130 S. Ct. 2011 Ct. (2010 . [Vol. 17:1 mined by the rational legal mechanism of the courts, as well as the arational ethical mechanism of contemporary society. Though the Supreme Court has been progressing along this trajectory for quite some time, only a year ago it made a remarkably bold move to reify the Eighth Amendment's protective mandate to shield all juvenile offenders from the most severe penalties. The objective of this Note is to analyze the groundwork of precedents leading to that moment, the remarkable moment itself contained in Graham's reasoning, and the implications for juveniles currently serving LWOP for homicide convictions, including the very recent 2012 Supreme Court case of Miller and Jackson 8 where the court diverged dramatically from its analysis in Graham without overruling it. The critical aim is to demonstrate that the Court's definitive direction is toward a new humanity that sees juvenile offenders as human beings with potential, subject to rehabilitation, and deserving of periodic review.
To begin, this Note will examine the historical background that lays the basis for contemporary juvenile justice, commencing with the first efforts of juvenile justice reform in New York, which drew a distinction between adult and juvenile offenders and led to the development of the first juvenile courts also concerned with the special needs that juvenile offenders present. This section will also discuss the early key Supreme Court decisions that carved out procedural due process rights for juveniles and opened the door for the question of substantive rights.
Subsequently, this Note will explore the terrain of the two lines of Eighth Amendment jurisprudence that have traditionally divided noncapital and capital cases into two distinct and absolute analytical domains. This analysis is indispensable to the larger project of this Note because the Court has always reserved capital-case review for challenges to impositions of the death penalty. That is until Graham, in which the Court not only used the test once reserved for death penalty challenges in a noncapital case, but it clearly articulated why it was important to apply capital-case jurisprudence to a noncapital case. 9 Third, and the pivot of this Note, will be an exegetical foray into the Supreme Court decision that changed the momentum of juvenile justice and made the challenge to LWOP in cases of homicide possible. Graham clearly articulates two mandates for the lower courts. First, the courts must observe and inculcate the diminished culpability of juvenile offenders in sentencing. 10 This Note argues that the Court's first mandate radiates beyond sentencing and stipulates that youth is more than a mitigating factor. It is a concurrent state of being that bears upon the entirety of the case. Second, the lower courts must guarantee a possibility of release even when the offense is appalling and the sentence severe. 10 Id. at 2026. 11 Id. at 2030.
Finally, the logic of Graham will be applied to State v. Ninham, the recent Wisconsin Supreme Court case laid out in the introduction, which tests the strength not only of the Eighth Amendment in asking whether the imposition of JLWOP in cases of homicide presents a constitutional failure, but also tests the strength of the penological foundation upon which such a sentencing structure is built. This Note will bear that answer in the affirmative and show that juvenile life without parole is a violation of the Eighth Amendment's bar on cruel and unusual punishment. Moreover, this Note suggests that the prospect of that answer rattles the entire criminal-justice system, leaving small fissures in the cement walls of a sentencing structure that has long been a failure to those imprisoned unto death, and the rest of society as well.
I. Historical Background: Juvenile Justice
In 1967, the Supreme Court introduced procedural regularity into delinquency proceedings. 12 Following this decision the Supreme Court and many lower courts continued this trajectory of juvenile-law reform that In re Gault initiated. The unintended consequence of extending procedural rights to juvenile offenders was that Gault overturned over 100 years of juvenile-justice reform that was committed to upholding the fundamental difference between adult and juvenile offenders. The result was the contemporary trend to accept no distinctions between adult and juvenile offenders' culpability. Gault and its predecessor, Kent v. United States, 13 mark the second wave in the effort to reform the juvenile-justice system. The third movement is typified by a more pronounced adherence to a policy that makes little penological distinction between adults and juveniles in sentencing schemes.
14 The fourth wave, initiated by the Supreme Court in the 2010 case Graham v. Florida, granted the protection of the Eighth Amendment to juvenile offenders. 15 The first monumental movement of juvenile-justice reformation in the United States occurred with the legislative act of March 29, 1824, which opened the doors of the New York House of Refuge, the first reformatory in the nation. 16 In 1820, a philanthropic Quaker association, 17 The Quaker reformers had a long history of charity and reform. As Sanford Fox notes, the Quakers had "achieved penal law revisions greatly diminishing the scope of capital punishment by replacing death and corporal penalties with sentences to newly erected prisons; they had created schools for the poorer classes, and engaged in widespread efforts to alleviate the suffering of the poor in their the Society for the Prevention of Pauperism, conducted an extensive survey of the nation's prisons. The results of the study revealed the deplorable treatment of prisoners, a prison system that did not discern a difference between adults and juveniles, and illogical sentencing schemes. In response, the Society established the juvenile reformatory.
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In 1849, a second House of Refuge was opened, which initiated the opening of several similar reformatories in other large American cities.
19
The juvenile reformatory was a complex, ambivalent development that was in effect a de facto retrenchment of adult correctional practices, a back-pedaling of law policy, a reaction to immigration and poverty, and a reflection of the alarming side of religious education, despite the public view that reformatories marked humanitarian progress.
20
Illinois passed the Juvenile Court Act in 1899, which would steer the juvenile justice system in a different direction until Kent in 1966. 21 The establishment of a court system distinct from adult jurisdiction resulted in six important outcomes. First, a separate court system stipulated that procedure could be bypassed. 22 Second, the court stressed the fundamental differences between adults and juveniles. 23 Third, hearings were to be informal with unique, individualized solutions unhampered by formal procedures. 24 Fourth, due process rights were largely ignored, "with the rationale that determining guilt or providing punishment was much less a concern than identifying the child's needs and administering appropri- 634 (1979) , posited three reasons why juveniles should be treated distinctly from adults: (1) vulnerability, (2) inability to make informed, mature, critical decisions, and (3) the presence and importance of the parent. In the 1970 case In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) , the court created a changing standard of proof, replacing the preponderance of evidence with beyond a reasonable doubt in juvenile criminal cases. In the 1982 case, Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982), the Supreme Court again insisted on the juvenile-adult difference and the necessity for different standards. The Court affirmed that "adolescents, particularly in the early and middle teen years, are more vulnerable, more impulsive, and less self-disciplined than adults. Crimes committed by youths may be just as harmful to victims as those committed by older persons, but they deserve less punishment because adolescents may have less capacity to control their conduct and to think in long-range terms than adults." Id. at 104 n.11 (alteration omitted) ( ate treatment and rehabilitative measures." 25 Fifth, the court created a language distinct from that used in criminal court. Adjudication and disposition replaced trial and sentence. 26 Lastly, the court sought alternatives to incarceration, created an early form of juvenile probation, and served as a social services hub.
27
However problematic the juvenile court was, it was remarkable for several reasons. The Act established the confidentiality of juvenile records, required juveniles be housed separately from adult inmates, and barred the imprisonment of children under the age of 12. 28 The general success of the juvenile court spread and so did the model. As Sanford Fox notes, "[t]he establishment of the court was hailed as a new era in our criminal history, and it was widely imitated in other states." 29 The juvenile courts operated without much scrutiny until a 1956 decision that emphasized the point of adjudication was to determine criminal responsibility and that such a determination required minimum procedural standards. 30 In response, several states enacted legislation that focused on due process in juvenile court actions. 31 In the midst of this shift of focus, the Supreme Court entered the discussion with Kent and Gault to announce a "revolution in the procedural aspects of juvenile courts."
32 Kent introduced to the juvenile proceeding the right to a hearing, to counsel, to counsel's access of court records, and the adherence to specific requirements of a juvenile waiver to adult jurisdiction. 33 Kent was followed by Gault, which introduced to the juvenile proceeding the right to notice of charges, a further expansion of the right to counsel, the right to confront witnesses, and the right to claim privilege against selfincrimination. 34 The juvenile court system, much like the House of Refuge and other reformatories, was intended to benefit juveniles and society, but was laden with systemic weakness and constitutional issues. matrix of these inherent flaws and the fear of criminal youth became the target of new reform. The late seventies, eighties, and nineties marked the third sea change in juvenile justice reform, and a return to pre-Enlightenment ideas about juvenile justice. 35 The shift from juvenile offenders who are seen as products of a pathological environment to juvenile offenders who are intrinsically evil and not worthy of rehabilitative initiatives is signified by a series of juvenile offender laws that swept the country beginning with New York in 1978. 36 Judges could no longer apply the Kent standard of assessing the juvenile's age, social background, or availability of programs that would be of benefit to the juvenile and her particular problems. "The traditional rehabilitative goal of juvenile sanctions [was] deemphasized in favor of straightforward adult-style punishment and longterm incarceration with fewer allowances for individual circumstances and [the] special needs of juveniles."
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Just as New York's House of Refuge served as a model for the development and maintenance of other reformatories, New York's juvenile offender laws served as a model for similar laws in almost every state. It appears the juvenile offender laws were created to solve perceived problems inherent in the juvenile court system, but failed in their efforts to effectively deal with the problem of juveniles in the criminal justice system. 38 In the fourth wave of juvenile justice reform, signaled by Graham, the Supreme Court took the lead and ushered in a more humane and successful approach to juvenile justice. The Court based its rationale on a nexus of understanding that acknowledges juvenile offenders present different needs and issues than their adult counterparts, and juvenile offenders are entitled to constitutional rights and safeguards. Part II of this Note will deal with the fourth wave as it manifests in Graham.
II. Graham v. Florida and the Shift in Cruel and Unusual

Punishment Jurisprudence
A. Introduction
Graham marks a radical development in Eighth Amendment CUP jurisprudence. Moreover, it signals a tectonic shift in the terrain of juvenile 35 "A new ideal of children as dependent, lacking the mental and physical capacities of adults, and in need of guidance arose and was universally accepted" throughout the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries when childhood became a social category. Aaron Kupchik, Judging Juveniles: Prosecuting Adolescents and Adult and Juvenile Courts 1 (2006) . 36 The site of New York for the first juvenile offender legislation is a particularly ironic given that New York was the testing ground for the first reformatory. See Fox, supra note 17. 37 Michael A. Corriero, Judging Children as Children: A Proposal for a Juvenile Justice System 129 (2006) . 38 See id. at 138.
justice, and suggests the imposition of LWOP is now subject to a new jurisprudential review. From Kent and Gault the Supreme Court moved along a trajectory mapped by a rational policy progression culminating in Graham. There is nothing remarkable in this ideological judicial progression save the Court's methodology, which is, however, astonishing. In order to reach its ruling in Graham, the Court had to jump the rails of jurisprudence and break with three decades of precedential theory, undermining a long established legal principle that 'death is different' based on its irrevocability and finality. 39 The basis of this division was built upon the theoretical foundation that "death is different", in part because it is irrevocable, and thus deserving of a different, more absolute, test.
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In Graham, the Court not only effaced the margin of demarcation that had established the theory and practice that death is different, and so subject to a separate Eighth Amendment review process; it also applied that review process, once reserved only for capital offenses, to a noncapital case. With the boundary of the imposition of death under erasure, the Court brought within the purview of capital review the sentence of LWOP, indicating life without any possibility of parole is a de facto death sentence.
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The issue before the Supreme Court, raised by Graham, was whether the CUP clause of the Eighth Amendment categorically precluded the imposition of LWOP in the case of a juvenile non-homicide offender. 42 The Court held that the Eighth Amendment does categorically ban JLWOP in cases of non-homicide, and the State must give a juvenile nonhomicide offender a meaningful opportunity to obtain release. 43 What is remarkable about this case is the Court's departure from the previous Eighth Amendment CUP jurisprudence. For 30 years, the Court relied on precedent in which it typically applied a two-step categorical test to capital cases to determine when to adopt an absolute ban on the death penalty for either classes of offenders or classes of offenses. 44 For nearly as long, the Court had made use of a distilled two-step balancing test for noncapital offenses, which under a case-by-case analysis determined, in light of all the circumstances, whether a particular sentence was disproportionate to the crime committed. 45 If it was held that a particular sentence for a particular offender was in violation of the Eighth Amendment's ban on CUP, the ruling only applied in the particular, extant case. However, a ruling under the categorical ban created a precedent and bright line rule effective for all members belonging to a class of offenders, based on characteristics, or effective for all offenders having committed a certain offense. 46 Graham abolished the capital/noncapital review distinction and applied the two-step categorical test to a noncapital case. Prior to Graham it was virtually impossible for a juvenile offender to meet the onerous threshold requirements of the first step of the balancing test to challenge a LWOP sentence in a non-homicide case. 47 After Graham, the court's holding ensured that no juvenile offender would serve LWOP for a nonhomicide offense. Furthermore, the decision opened the door to the potential extension of the Eighth Amendment's protection to the entire class of juveniles convicted of LWOP under any circumstances. 48 Even more remarkable, but beyond the scope of this Note, Graham created micro-fractures in the foundation of a sentencing scheme that makes use of LWOP for all offenders.
B. Statement of the Facts
At age 16, Terrance Jamar Graham was first arrested with three juvenile male accomplices for attempted robbery, and under Florida law was charged as an adult for armed burglary with assault, which carried a potential sentence of life in prison without parole. 49 He was also charged with a second burglary offense and faced an additional 15-year sentence. 50 Graham negotiated a plea agreement in which he pled guilty to both charges and submitted to the court a heartfelt letter attesting to his commitment to lead a better life. In response, the court withheld adjudication of guilt on both charges and reduced the sentence to two concurrent three-year terms of probation with the first 12 months being spent in county jail. Graham was released on June 25, 2004.
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Within six months Graham was again arrested with two adult male accomplices, and charged with home invasion robbery. Graham and his accomplices knocked on the door of the home of Carlos Rodriguez, forcibly entered, held Rodriguez and his friend at gunpoint, ransacked the home and then locked Rodriguez and the other man in the closet before leaving. Graham and his two accomplices were alleged to have attempted a second robbery during which one of Graham's accomplices was shot. Graham drove the other two men to the hospital in his father's vehicle 46 Id. 47 Id. 48 Id. at 370. 49 63 This application has not always been reserved for noncapital cases, and makes use of a balancing test. The second classification applies to cases in which the Court implemented the proportionality standard by certain categorical restrictions, such as the collateral defenses of infancy 64 or mental impairment. 65 The second type of review has always been reserved for capital cases. The two classifications make use of different, but somewhat similar tests.
Balancing Test and Noncapital
Offense Jurisprudence "In the first classification the Court considers all of the circumstances of the case to determine whether the sentence is unconstitutionally excessive." 66 The balancing test has been distilled into two stages, the first of which is a threshold analysis to determine whether the defendant has established an inference of "gross disproportionality." 67 This assessment is comprised of an inquiry into the gravity of the offense as it balances against the severity of the penalty. 68 The second step of the balancing test consists of intra-jurisdictional and inter-jurisdictional analyses. Under the inter-jurisdictional analysis, the Court examines the sentences for the same crime in other jurisdictions. Under the intra-jurisdictional analysis, the Court examines sentences imposed on other criminals in the same jurisdiction. 69 For both of these analyses the Court looks at the legislatively available sentencing and judicial practices, or the actual sentencing outcomes.
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The measure for gross proportionality is ultimately derived from Kennedy's controlling opinion in Harmelin v. Michigan. 71 First, the Court must compare the gravity of the crime with the severity of the sentence. If the case makes it past this threshold question, the Court must then en- 73 However, precedent shows it is highly unlikely any defendant could meet this threshold inquiry to survive to the intra and inter-jurisdictional analyses.
Indeed, Graham would most likely not have survived the threshold analysis. Disproportionality under the Eighth Amendment is not demonstrated sufficiently unless it is so severe as to shock the conscience. 74 Prior to Graham, there were several unsuccessful cases in which the penalty seemed grossly disproportionate to the crime. Nevertheless, the Court upheld the lower courts' sentencing in near total deference. 75 The Court has been notably less favorable to defendants under the balancing test because at its base it is a stringent threshold test. Since the 1980 case, Rummel v. Estelle, in which the prototype balancing test was outlined in Justice Powell's dissent, there has only been one successful case analyzed under the balancing test. 76 In Solem v. Helm, the Court held it unconstitutional to sentence an offender to LWOP for the crime of writing a bad check.
77 Solem is an isolated example. In most cases the threshold the defendant must meet to challenge the proportionality step is onerous. 78 In Harmelin, the defendant was sentenced to LWOP for drug possession on the basis that the Eighth Amendment has a narrow proportionality principle that does not require strict proportionality between crime and sentence, and only precludes extreme or grossly disproportionate sentences. 79 Furthermore, in Ewing v. California, the Court upheld a 25-years-to-life sentence for a defendant charged with the theft of three golf clubs valued at $399 each under three-strikes recidivist sentencing.
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In addition, Rummel upheld a LWOP sentence for obtaining money by false pretenses following two prior non-violent felony convictions. 
Categorical Test and Capital Offense Jurisprudence
The second classification, traditionally reserved for capital cases, applies categorical rules to Eighth Amendment standards. This classification is further broken down into two subsets. First, there are the cases in which the Court is asked to consider the nature of the offense. For example, in Kennedy v. Louisiana the Court held that the Eighth Amendment's CUP clause precludes the death penalty as a sentence for nonhomicide cases, specifically where the defendant is convicted of the nonhomicide rape of a child. 82 Another example is Enmund v. Florida, in which the Court held the Eighth Amendment also precluded the death penalty for felony offenders who did not kill, or intend to kill, in the course of committing the felony crime but an accomplice did kill. 83 In the second subset, the Court considers the characteristics of the offender. Roper held that the Eighth Amendment categorically bars the death penalty for any person who committed the offense while under the age of 18. 84 Before Roper, Atkins held that the Eighth Amendment barred the execution of mentally challenged offenders. 85 Precedent shows that the Court is more amenable to a categorical ban than it is to vacating a discrete and particular sentence. The Court has been more favorable in its opinions on what constitutes CUP when the question was posed for an entire class of offenders or an entire class of offense, rather than when the challenge came from a singular offender in reference to an offender's particular offense.
Under the categorical analysis, the Court, following the reasoning it set out in Trop v. Dulles 86 first considers "objective indicia of society's standards, as expressed in legislative enactments and state practice" 87 in order to surmise if there is a national consensus on the particular issue. The second step involves the Court's own independent judgment as guided by "the standards elaborated by controlling precedents and by the Court's own understanding and interpretation of the Eighth Amendment's text, history, meaning, and purpose." 88 As Roper indicated, the Court must use its own judgment to determine whether the penalty violates the Eighth Amendment's ban on CUP. 
D. Opinion of the Court
Justice Kennedy, writing for the Supreme Court in a 6-3 decision, with Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor joining, outlined the new categorical test by which JLWOP cases would be reviewed. 90 Chief Justice Roberts wrote a concurrence in the judgment, arguing the Court would have reached the same holding had it adhered to precedent and applied the balancing test in the extant non-homicide case rather than the once-reserved categorical test; 91 though it is highly improbable given that Graham would not likely have surpassed the onerous threshold requirements of the first step of the balancing test. 92
Step 1: Objective Indicia of a National Consensus on a Sentence of LWOP for a Non-homicide Juvenile Offender
Graham begins its categorical analysis with a review of the "objective indicia of national consensus."
93 Atkins determined that the most reliable indicator of the national consensus, the objective indicia of the public pulse, is legislation. 94 The numbers the Court considered presented a nation that is not clearly opposed to LWOP sentencing for juveniles convicted of non-homicide felony offenses. Six jurisdictions completely bar the sentence. 95 Seven allow JLWOP only in the case of homicide. 96 However, 37 states, the District of Colombia, and Federal law permit sentences of JLWOP for offenders convicted of non-homicide crimes. 97 This metric would appear to show a consensus in favor of the sentence. But, and this is crucial, the Court does not read the data as such.
The Court finds this information is "incomplete and unavailing."
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Quoting Kennedy, the Court notes, "There are measures of consensus other than legislation." 99 Following Enmund, Thompson, Atkins, Roper, and Kennedy, judicial practice is also a part of the equation. 100 In every jurisdiction that, on its face, supported LWOP sentences for juvenile offenders, a closer analysis of the actual sentencing practices revealed a decided consensus against it. The number of juveniles actually serving life without pa- 90 Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011 , 2017 . 91 Id. at 2036-41 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in the judgment). 92 But see id. at 2040 (arguing Graham passes the threshold requirement because, while Graham's crimes were serious and deserving of punishment, he was not "particularly dangerous-at least relative to the murderers and rapists for whom the sentence of life without parole is typically reserved"). 93 Id. at 2023 (majority opinion The Court notes its own research yielded a total of "11 jurisdictions nationwide in fact impose life without parole sentences on juvenile nonhomicide offenders-and most of those do so quite rarely."
103 Thus, most of the states that legislatively authorize the sentence never impose it. Even more important to this metric is the fact that the number would be representative of all of the sentences going back quite some time since it is likely a juvenile sentenced to die in prison would in fact be there for decades, making the numbers seem inflated. 104 In terms of national consensus on LWOP for juvenile offenders convicted on non-homicide offenses, the Court concludes, "it is fair to say that a national consensus has developed against it."
105 Though the Court has in its sights the offense qualification of "non-homicide," its inevitable focal point and the ultimate basis of its decision is life without parole qua life without parole imposed upon juvenile offenders.
Step 2: The Independent Judgment of the Court
The second step in the categorical test is the "judicial exercise of independent judgment."
106 The Court's own independent judgment is couched in several subset analyses. First, the Court must examine the culpability of the offender in light of the crime. Next, the Court analyzes the severity of the punishment. 107 Finally, the Court considers the penological justifications for the sentence and whether the goals of the sentence are met: deterrence, retribution, incapacitation, and rehabilitation. 108 
a. Juvenile Culpability
The Court notes that since Roper, juveniles are regarded as having diminished culpability and thus are held less accountable for their crimes and ultimately less deserving of the most severe punishments. 109 Roper made several comparative analyses that bear upon Graham. Juveniles have a "lack of maturity and an underdeveloped sense of responsibility," and they "are more vulnerable or susceptible to negative influences and outside pressures, including peer pressure;" moreover, their characters are "not as well formed." 110 These qualities make it particularly problematic to assess maturity and psychological development. It is difficult for a trained psychologist to determine the difference between juvenile offenders who are temporarily caught in "transient immaturity" and "the rare juvenile offender whose crime reflects irreparable corruption." 111 As such, there is no way to reliably classify juvenile offenders as the worst of the worst, deserving of the most severe penalties, without risking those juveniles unfortunate enough to suffer from their "transient immaturity."
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Roper emphatically denied its aim was to absolve juvenile offenders of responsibility for crimes committed, but it did assert that a juvenile offender cannot be held to the same standards of culpability as an adult, and therefore cannot be sentenced to the same penalty as an adult. 113 Similarly, Thompson affirmed that a juvenile offender's transgressions are "not as morally reprehensible as that of an adult." 114 In fact, several of Graham's amici briefs show that as social science research has become more sophisticated and technology has advanced to allow a more complex understanding of the mechanics of the brain in an effort to understand the mind, the difference between juveniles and adults has become irrepressible. 115 The results of these advanced studies show fundamental differences between adult and juvenile cognitive abilities. 116 There are multiple differences between an adult brain and a juvenile brain. While juveniles have more difficulty making sound decisions than average adults, they are also more amenable to change and thus "their actions are less likely to be evidence of 'irretrievably depraved character. '" 117 As to the categorical culpability of juveniles, the Court concludes, "[i]t remains true that '[f]rom a moral standpoint it would be misguided to equate the failings of a minor with those of an adult, for a greater possibility exists that a minor's character deficiencies will be reformed. ' b. Penological Justifications The Court then assesses the severity of the punishment and its justification. The Court notes that LWOP is the second harshest penalty available by law to offenders convicted of felonies. 119 While LWOP is not the same as a death sentence per se, it does share some marked characteristics: finality and irrevocability. As with the death penalty, LWOP "alters the offender's life by a forfeiture that is irrevocable. It deprives the convict of the most basic liberties without giving hope of restoration, except perhaps by executive clemency-the remote possibility of which does not mitigate the harshness of the sentence."
120 The Court quotes Naovarath v. State in positing that LWOP "means denial of hope; it means that good behavior and character improvement are immaterial; it means that whatever the future might hold in store for the mind and spirit of [the convict], he will remain in prison for the rest of his days." 121 In terms of juvenile sentencing, since Roper, the state no longer executes the juvenile offender, but the sentence of LWOP promises the juvenile he or she will die in prison barring near miraculous clemency. It appears to be a very long, drawn out, and hopeless death sentence. The Court asserts, that, in the case of a juvenile, LWOP is especially harsh because the young age of the offender ensures a much longer life in prison then many adults would suffer. "A 16-year-old and a 75-year-old each sentenced to life without parole receive the same punishment in name only. . . . This reality cannot be ignored."
122 In this regard, LWOP is a much harsher penalty for a juvenile offender than it would be for an adult offender convicted of the same crime, with the result that juvenile offenders are held to a higher culpability standard or subject to more severe penalties than their adult counterparts.
The Court next considers the penological justifications of the sentence. Graham finds that there are no penological justifications for JLWOP. 123 Again, the Court has in mind non-homicide juvenile offenders, but its focal point is the imposition of life without parole. The Court notes that while legislatures can choose which goals undergird the sentencing schemes they enact,
[ retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitationprovides an adequate justification.
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The Court works through each penal sanction, looking for a measure of justification to legitimize the sentence of LWOP for juvenile offenders.
c. Retribution The Court acknowledges that retribution, a severe sanction imposed to express condemnation of a crime, is a legitimate reason to penalize. However, retribution cannot support a sentence of JLWOP because the foundational theory of retribution is the idea that the criminal sentence must be directly related to the culpability of the offender; and the culpability of a juvenile offender is de facto diminished.
125 "[A]s Roper observed, '[w]hether viewed as an attempt to express the community's moral outrage or as an attempt to right the balance for the wrong to the victim, the case for retribution is not as strong with a minor as with an adult.'" 126 Most importantly, "Roper found that '[r]etribution is not proportional if the law's most severe penalty is imposed' on the juvenile murderer," because the juvenile murderer is still less culpable than the adult murderer and thus must not be subject to the most severe penalty available.
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d. Deterrence Like retribution, deterrence, the negative calculus in the balancing of the decision to commit the crime or not, cannot support a sentence of JLWOP. The source of a juvenile's diminished culpability will also likely be the source of a lack of forethought in the juvenile's decision-making repertoire. " [T] hey are less likely to take a possible punishment into consideration when making decisions."
128 This is especially the case when the punishment is so rarely imposed and particularly when the juvenile operates under the misconception that juveniles are exempt from adult punishment. 129 terms of juvenile offenders, the goal of incapacitation, the avoidance of future repetitions of violent crimes and protection of the community, is undermined by the fact that there does not exist an assessment to determine, with accuracy, which juvenile offenders will reoffend. 132 To justify LWOP, the most severe incapacitation, the Court must be extremely positive the offender is one who will most likely reoffend. There is no reliable way to make that assessment of juveniles due to their mercurial and developing characters and maturity levels, as well as their abilities to adapt and develop under different circumstances. 133 An assessment of a juvenile as forever a danger to society is a dangerous assumption because, as Roper noted, it is "difficult even for expert psychologists to differentiate between the juvenile offender whose crime reflects unfortunate yet transient immaturity, and the rare juvenile offender whose crime reflects irreparable corruption." 134 Graham finds that LWOP precludes any possibility that a juvenile might grow and mature; and furthermore, there is a conceptual problem in determining the future unfolding of an entire life without any real basis. As the Court notes, "Even if the State's judgment that Graham was incorrigible were later corroborated by prison misbehavior or failure to mature, the sentence was still disproportionate because that judgment was made at the outset."
135 Even if there is some merit to the absolute and total life incapacitation of a juvenile offender, "[i]ncapacitation cannot override all other considerations, lest the Eighth Amendment's rule against disproportionate sentences be a nullity." 136 f. Rehabilitation Rehabilitation forms the basis of the parole system, and it used to form the basis of the juvenile justice system. Florida not only transfers juveniles into adult criminal court for certain felony offenses, but Florida law also abolished the parole system, and in so doing abolished any goal of rehabilitation for offenders serving life sentences. Thus, a life sentence without parole has no relation to rehabilitation. Arguably, LWOP is not appropriate for any juvenile offender regardless of offense. Furthermore, juvenile offenders are most in need of rehabilitation, and the absence of such opportunities "makes the disproportionality of the sentence all the more evident."
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Graham finds no penological justification for JLWOP in nonhomicide cases. 140 The diminished culpability and the severity of the sentence indicate that the punishment is cruel and unusual for this class of offender. 141 The Court holds that the Eighth Amendment prohibits such sentences for non-homicide juvenile offenders. 142 The Court further holds that the State must give juvenile defendants a "meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation." 143 The Court then goes on to explain why its analysis and holding are categorical and must apply to the entire class of offenders sentenced to LWOP rather than merely apply to individuals on a case-by-case basis: "This clear line is necessary to prevent the possibility that life without parole sentences will be imposed on juvenile non-homicide offenders who are not sufficiently culpable to merit that punishment." 144 The entire class of juvenile offender post-Graham has, by definition, diminished culpability.
The Court concedes that a categorical rule will lead to the release on parole of a few juvenile offenders who truly should not be placed amidst the public due to incurable psychopathy or an essential corruption that may present a danger to individuals or the community. 145 However, the Court counters with the assertion that the Constitutional principle of the Eighth Amendment overrides that consideration because of the subjective nature of determining which juvenile offenders are "incorrigible" and "irredeemably depraved." 146 The Court notes,
[E]ven if we were to assume that some juvenile non-homicide offenders might have "sufficient psychological maturity, and at the same time demonstrat[e] sufficient depravity," to merit a life without parole sentence, it does not follow that courts taking a case-bycase proportionality approach could with sufficient accuracy distin- 139 Id. 140 Id. at 2028-30. 141 Id. at 2030. 142 Id. 143 Id. 144 Id. The Court tempers this position by asserting that in no way does the Eighth Amendment's Cruel and Unusual Clause guarantee a release from prison. If a juvenile offender cannot demonstrate growth and maturity and his crimes are "truly horrifying" his irredeemable quality may preclude him from early release or parole. Id. The Court is not radically reading the Eighth Amendment in light of juvenile nonhomicide offenders; it is merely saying the State cannot bury a juvenile offender alive, throw away the key, or permanently exile him to a prison cell until he meets his death. The Court is saying there must be a time for review. 145 Id. at 2032. 146 Id. at 2031. [Vol. 17:1 guish the few incorrigible juvenile offenders from the many that have the capacity for change.
147
The subjectivity involved in determining the true character of a juvenile offender is also problematic because in many cases the heinous nature of the crime, or the very age of the offender, will operate as an aggravating factor diminishing the mitigating factor that the age of the offender should be. 148 Roper, in making a determination on the death penalty, concluded:
An unacceptable likelihood exists that the brutality or cold-blooded nature of any particular crime would overpower mitigating arguments based on youth as a matter of course, even where the juvenile offender's objective immaturity, vulnerability, and lack of true depravity should require a sentence less severe than death.
149
Moreover, there are unavoidable procedural problems because a juvenile offender cannot be a fully functioning part of his own defense due to his immaturity and cognitive capabilities. The Court refers to an amicus brief submitted by the NAACP to draw attention to the issues encountered by counsel representing juvenile offenders. As the amicus notes, "the features that distinguish juveniles from adults also put them at a significant disadvantage in criminal proceedings. . . . They are less likely than adults to work effectively with their lawyers to aid in their defense." 150 The Court further notes the likelihood of the "[d]ifficulty in weighing long-term consequences; a corresponding impulsiveness; and reluctance to trust defense counsel . . . all [of which] can lead to poor decisions by one charged with a juvenile offense." 151 A categorical rule prevents the possibility of an assumption that a juvenile is sufficiently culpable, mature enough to have a meaningful role in the process, and deserving of the most severe sentence a juvenile can receive. 152 
g. International Consensus
Finally, world consensus views JLWOP for non-homicide and homicide offenders as cruel and unusual punishment. While international opinion is not dispositive of the meaning of the Constitution, it "is also 'not irrelevant. ' global consensus against the sentencing practice in question." 154 The Court notes that only 11 nations authorize the sentence under any circumstance, and only the United States and Israel impose the punishment. 155 Moreover, Israel has only seven juvenile offenders serving a life sentence without parole, and the sentence itself is subject to a periodic review process. 156 The Court further notes: "that Article 37(a) of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, ratified by every nation except the United States and Somalia, prohibits the imposition of 'life imprisonment without possibility of release . . . for offences committed by persons below eighteen years of age.'" 157
Conclusion of Graham
The Court concludes that the "Constitution prohibits the imposition of a life without parole sentence on a juvenile offender who did not commit homicide." 158 The State must provide a reasonable opportunity to such an offender to obtain release based on growth of character and maturity. 159 Since the Court held that the challenge Graham raised questioned the appropriateness of a particular penalty for an entire class of offenders, the first stage of the balancing test, the threshold analysis, would not advance the Court's present inquiry. 160 The Court stated the best approach was the categorical test utilized in Atkins, Roper, and Kennedy. 161 "By citing these three decisions in this way, the Court gave the impression that Graham followed naturally from established case law," even though those cases were all capital cases and the Court had a long tradition of treating capital and noncapital cases dissimilarly. 162 The majority gave three primary justifications for employing a categorical approach. The first reason was based on institutional competen- 154 Id. (citations omitted). 155 Id. 156 See id. "However, Israeli officials have confirmed that the seven individuals serving these life without parole sentences are now entitled to parole review, leaving the U.S., with its nearly 2,500 cases, all alone in the world." Ian S. Thompson, Congress to Examine Juvenile Life Without Parole-A Human Rights Stain for the U.S., ACLU Blog of Rights (Sept. 11, 2008, 2:13 PM), http://www.aclu.org/blog/defending-targetsdiscrimination/congress-examine-juvenile-life-without-parole-human-rights. It seems there remains some dispute as to the exact use of the review process, and furthermore that such a review process is subject to political changes in Israel. However, that Israel has opened up discussion on the topic and left room for the possibility of a review process is an indicator of the changing penological ideology in the one remaining "Western" or "democratic" country, other than the United States, that has retained the imposition of JLWOP. 157 Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2034 (quoting United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child art. 37(a), Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3, 55 (entered into force Sept. 2, 1990)). 158 Id. 159 Id. 160 Id. at 2023. 161 Id. 162 Siegler & Sullivan, supra note 44, at 354.
cies. The Court found that there was no reliable test of corruption that could be applied to a juvenile to determine which juveniles would reoffend and which were amenable to rehabilitation. 163 Therefore, any judgment of a juvenile offender that was based on future dangerousness or essential corruption would be faulty at best. The second concern, also under institutional competencies, was the fact that the same cognitive capacities that rendered a juvenile less culpable, also rendered a juvenile less able to be a meaningful part of his own defense. 164 The final justification the Court relied on in its opinion was that "a categorical rule gives all juvenile nonhomicide offenders a chance to demonstrate maturity and reform," whereas an individualized balancing test addresses one particular instance and the difficulty of meeting the threshold requirements would likely preclude the vast majority of juvenile offenders from raising legitimate CUP challenges. 165 The Court also took under consideration the subjective nature of a balancing test and the likelihood that the heinousness of a crime would act as an aggravating factor. The Court, citing the trial judge, noted that he had reached "a discretionary, subjective judgment . . . that the offender [was] irredeemably depraved," without taking into account the possibility that he had diminished culpability, which undermined the imposition LWOP. 166 Moreover,
[b]ecause a sufficiently heinous or grotesque offense can always trump the generally diminished culpability of juveniles, maintaining the balance test would result in a whole cadre of juvenile offenders being subjected to life-without-parole sentences despite a lessened culpability which . . . should have saved them from that fate.
167
Despite the potential release of a few juveniles not deserving of parole under a categorical test, a balancing test will undoubtedly ensure many juveniles not deserving of LWOP will receive such a sentence. Following Blackstone's Ratio, 168 and the long legacy of the legal principle of the presumption of innocence, 169 commentators have noted, "As a matter 163 Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2031-32. 164 Id. at 2032. 165 Id. 166 Id. at 2031. 167 Siegler & Sullivan, supra note 44, at 365. 168 The English Jurist William Blackstone articulated what became known as Blackstone's Ratio: " [B] etter that ten guilty persons escape than that one innocent suffer." 4 William Blackstone, Commentaries *358. 169 Aristotle notes, "Again, every one of us would rather acquit a guilty man as innocent than condemn an innocent man as guilty in a case of enslaving or murder. . . . Whenever there is any doubt one should choose the lesser of two errors." 2 Aristotle, Problems bk. 29, ch. 13, ll. 951a37-951b5 (W.S. Hett ed. & trans., Harvard University Press 1937) (author's translation). In the 12th century, the legal theorist Moses Maimonides argued "it is better and more satisfactory to acquit a thousand guilty persons than to put a single innocent man to death." 2 Maimonides, of constitutional policy, the Court's choice could be justified on the ground that an overinclusive rule provides more effective enforcement of Eighth Amendment values than an underinclusive balancing test." 170 " [T] he Court recognized that the only effective alternative to the balancing test . . . was a categorical test which gave no discretion to sentencing authorities and required that everyone eighteen and under would win if the test were met." 171 Graham marks a clear break with precedent and the creation of a new standard of review in noncapital cases that utilizes the categorical test and promises far reaching implications for other noncapital challenges, particularly the timely question of the sentence of JLWOP in cases of homicide. 172 Both cases involved a 14-year-old offender ultimately charged as an adult, convicted of murder, and sentenced to a mandatory term of life without the possibility of parole. friend followed a neighbor back to his home, smoked marijuana, and played drinking games until the neighbor passed out. The boys removed the neighbor's wallet from his pocket and stole $300. The neighbor awoke when the boys tried to replace it and a struggle ensued. The boys beat the neighbor with a baseball bat and left. They later returned to hide the crime and set the house on fire. The neighbor succumbed to a combination of his injuries from the beating and smoke inhalation.
174
The backbone of the reasoning in Graham is that categorical rules are necessary when an Eighth Amendment challenge implicates a particular sentence as it applies to an entire class of offenders who have committed a range of crimes. In such cases, the court has traditionally relied on a categorical analysis. 175 In Miller, the particular sentence at issue was life without parole. The class was comprised entirely of juvenile offenders, and homicide covers a range of varied offenses and crimes. 176 The Court should have extended the reasoning in Graham to Miller.
Graham requires adherence to a categorical rule in the sentencing of juveniles for several reasons. First, laws requiring a proportionality analysis allow the imposition of sentences based on a discretionary, subjective judgment that the juvenile offender is irredeemably depraved at the same time holding the juvenile offender to the same standards as an adult counterpart; but there is no reliable way to make this determination and it ignores the diminished culpability of juveniles. 177 Thus, laws that allow proportionality tests to determine juvenile sentencing are insufficient to prevent the most severe sentence available despite diminished culpability and insufficient assessment of permanent incorrigibility.
178 Second, a case-by-case approach where the offender's age is weighed against the seriousness or heinousness of the crime would not allow courts to distinguish with sufficient accuracy the few juveniles who may qualify as mature and depraved enough to warrant an irrevocable sentence, and those juveniles who may have the capacity for change. 179 Third, a proportionality approach does not take into consideration special difficulties that arise with juvenile representation, such as 176 In Jackson's case, involving the 14-year-old who was an abettor in an armed robbery, Jackson did not commit a murder but was nonetheless pulled into the charge of felony murder by his co-conspirator function in the crime. impulsiveness, inability to calculate future outcomes, inability to understand procedures, or ability to effectively communicate with counsel. 180 A categorical rule avoids these risks and ensures that a court or jury will not erroneously conclude that a juvenile offender is sufficiently culpable to deserve the most severe and irrevocable penalty. A categorical rule allows a juvenile offender to mature and change.
181
The Miller Court dispensed with Graham in favor of a proportionality principle. Miller is divided into two sections. The first section follows the logic and reason of Graham, arguing that juveniles have a de facto and de jure diminished culpability status. 182 The Court does not seem to take issue with the precedent that Graham establishes. However, the holding in Miller gravitates around the qualification of the sentence as "mandatory:"
By requiring that all children convicted of homicide receive lifetime incarceration without the possibility of parole, regardless of their age and age-related characteristics and the nature of their crimes, the mandatory sentencing schemes before us violate this principle of proportionality, and so the Eighth Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual punishment.
183
The second part of the opinion explains how proportionality factors into the constitutional analysis of the sentence, 184 and is the undoing of Graham.
The second half of the decision relies on a line of precedent from the late 1970s. Those cases established that statutes mandating the death penalty for first-degree murder violated the Eighth Amendment. 185 The court reasons that since Graham likened juvenile life without parole to a death sentence, and the death sentence following Woodson and Lockett requires a consideration of mitigating factors, JLWOP must employ a proportionality test that considers age as a mitigating factor. 186 However, mandatory sentencing schemes preclude any mitigation or proportionality consideration.
It is unclear why the Court refused to extend Graham's categorical rule to all juvenile offenders because the Court offered no expanded explanation. The Court merely stated that it anticipated the sentence would be uncommon once courts and juries were required to consider age as a 180 Id. at 2032. 181 (1976) . These cases together held that sentencing authorities are required to consider the characteristics of a defendant and the details of the offense before sentencing him to death. The aim was to apply mitigating factors where they existed. See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2463-64. 186 Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2466-67. [Vol. 17:1 mitigating factor in a proportionality analysis. 187 The Court further noted that the current ruling was sufficient to address the two cases before it.
188
Following Miller, it is likely that many juvenile offenders who could have been rehabilitated, who would have matured and changed, will be sentenced to life without parole. The Court has circumscribed, and potentially neutered, the categorical rule set out in Graham, leaving many juvenile offenders subject to the arbitrary, subjective discretion of courts and juries who may be shocked by both the heinousness of a crime and the age of an offender. As problematic as it is hopeful, the volte-face analysis of Miller and Jackson does not clearly overrule Graham, seemingly leaving courts and juries with sentencing options and the wide range of discretion the Graham court warned against. Since Miller did not overrule Graham, Graham's reasoning can and should still be the basis for creating a categorical rule against LWOP for juvenile offenders under the age of 18.
III. Application: Reading State v. Ninham Through Graham's Eyes
Graham represents a new strategy available to defendants who can convince the Court to apply the categorical test, rather than the balancing test, to a noncapital Eighth Amendment challenge. The categorical test begins when the Court considers the evolving standards of decency as indicated by the objective indicia, showing legislative authorization of a penalty for a particular class of offender and judicial practice that utilizes such penalty, in order to assess the national consensus on the issue.
189
The Court then exercises its own independent judgment based on a balance of the culpability of the offender and the nature and harshness of the penalty. 190 When the court considers the culpability of the offender, it also takes into consideration the penological justifications of the punishment (deterrence, retribution, incapacitation, and rehabilitation).
191
Though not probative of the Court's interpretation of the Eighth Amendment's CUP provision, the Court also considers the international consensus in an effort to bolster its own conclusion.
192
The two-step process of the categorical test can be applied to other noncapital cases so long as the defendant's challenge rests on the Court's acceptance of him as a member of a recognized and distinct class. 193 He is considered a member of a class (offender or offense) if one or both of the following factors are met: he can show diminished culpability as an offender, or CUP. The strongest case a juvenile could make in his or her 187 Id. at 2469. 188 Eighth Amendment challenge to LWOP rests on diminished culpability. Following Graham, youth is such a strong mitigating factor that it undermines any possible penological justification for LWOP. In fact, youth is more than a mitigating factor; being a juvenile is a collateral defense that should result in a lesser sentence than an adult could expect under similar circumstances, and a differential treatment throughout the entire process. To build a case upon this factor the defendant should point out to the Court the "dilemma of juvenile sentencing"
194 under the balancing test: the case-by-case nature of the balancing test has no boundaries of application and provides little guidance to the lower courts; mitigating factors may actually be undermined by heinous crimes as juvenile offenders are presented as bad seeds by the state with the youth of the offender presented as an aggravating factor; and finally, the insufficient metric of the characteristics of the offender as a juvenile render any psychological tests of future dangerousness and essential corruption suspect. 195 The precedent that Graham sets applies to JLWOP for homicide offenses because the culpability of the juvenile offender is diminished in the homicide case just as it is diminished in the non-homicide case. Culpability belongs to the offender, not the offense. The categorical ban in Graham asserted the bottom line lower culpability for juvenile offenders based on their class as juveniles. Furthermore, the punishment of JLWOP is CUP in light of the lack of penological justifications of the sentence for the juvenile's particular class and the comparatively longer sentence a juvenile offender could expect, in relation to that of a comparable adult counterpart, because of his young age.
A. Introduction
Graham should have set a strong precedent for State v. Ninham, 196 a recent Wisconsin Supreme Court case, in answering the question of whether LWOP for a juvenile offender convicted of intentional homicide violates the Eighth Amendment's CUP provision.
B. Procedural History
Ninham's June 14, 1999 charge of first-degree intentional homicide and physical abuse of a child subjected him to the jurisdiction of Wisconsin's criminal court. 197 In October of 1999, Ninham was further charged with making threats to a judge and to several of his accomplices, and to intimidating witnesses. 198 to do with the offense. 199 A pre-sentence investigation revealed his "extremely dysfunctional family structure," and a household of substance abuse and domestic violence. 200 Ninham himself was a substance abuser since grade school, drinking "alcohol every day, often alone, and usually to the point of unconsciousness."
201 On June 29, 2000, the circuit court sentenced Ninham to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole on the first-degree intentional homicide count. 202 As to the second count-physical abuse of a child-the court sentenced Ninham to five years' imprisonment consecutive to the first sentence.
203
The circuit court based its decision on three factors. First, the court considered the "gravity of the offense," and determined it was "beyond description," and "indisputably horrific."
204 Next, the court looked at the character of Ninham, referring to him as a "frightening young man," and a "child of the street who knew what he was doing." 205 Finally, the court reasoned that the community must be protected from Ninham. 206 The court's decision was not affected by any mitigating factors presented by Ninham, as it declined to view mitigating factors, referring to them as poor excuses.
14-year-old to life imprisonment without parole is unconstitutional." 212 Furthermore, the court of appeals rejected Ninham's contention that his penalty was a violation of the Eighth Amendment, and denied his new factor for consideration on the basis that the lower court was well aware of the new scientific findings but found them, nonetheless, irrelevant in this case.
213
On May 20, 2011, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin, in reviewing Ninham, held that a life sentence of imprisonment without parole for intentional homicide imposed upon a juvenile was "not categorically unconstitutional," on the basis that it was neither unduly harsh nor excessive; 214 and that Ninham had failed to convincingly show a new factor of a body of scientific research showing that the adolescent brain "is not fully developed . . . and that making impulsive decisions and engaging in risky behavior is an inevitable part of adolescence."
215
C. The Categorical Analysis
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin explicitly stated that the Graham decision guided its own approach to Ninham, 216 and therefore the court applied a categorical test based on Graham, which was, however, categorical in name only, or at best, a mutilated categorical test. Furthermore, the court disregarded the results of its own analysis to draw a non sequitur finding that ignored all the points that worked in Ninham's favor. Disregarding the Court's logic in Graham, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin overlooked Ninham's diminished culpability as a juvenile and the severity of the sentence given the lack of penal justifications upon which the sentence was based. Since the Wisconsin Supreme Court "stayed Ninham's petition for review pending the Supreme Court's decision in Graham" and granted his review on the basis of the finding in Graham, 217 it is curious that the court then chose not to apply the logic of Graham to its analysis of Ninham or give an explanation for its departure from the precedent it claimed held sway over the present case. Perhaps the best way to outline the Supreme Court of Wisconsin's incorrect holding and its analytical failure is to juxtapose it with the reasoning of Graham-a holding and rationale that should have guided the Supreme Court of Wisconsin, in more than name only, in its treatment of Ninham.
In his appeal, Ninham sought modification of his LWOP sentence on the grounds that the "sentence [was] unduly harsh and excessive;" that findings of recent research on the developing adolescent brain present a new factor for consideration and frustrate the sentence and the 212 Id. at 462. 213 Id. 214 Id. at 478. 215 Id. at 475-76, 478. 216 Id. at 478. 217 Id. at 462. culpability factors that underlie it; and finally, because "the circuit court relied on an improper factor when imposing the sentence." 218 The crucial question before the court was whether sentencing a 14-year-old to LWOP for intentional homicide is a sentence that meets the definition of CUP under the Eighth Amendment, and is thus categorically unconstitutional. 219 Under Wisconsin state law, a juvenile ten years old or older who commits intentional homicide is subject to adult jurisdiction in criminal court. 220 A person who commits a first-degree homicide is guilty of a class A felony 221 and may be subject to a penalty of life imprisonment. 222 All sentences of life in prison for crimes committed on or after August 31, 1995, but before December 31, 1999, are subject to judicial discretion in terms of parole eligibility. 223 The circuit court was within its statutory authority when it sentenced Ninham to life in prison without the possibility of parole, though it was not mandated by statute to impose such a severe sentence.
Categorical Test, Step 1: Objective Indicia of a National Consensus
The state supreme court did look to the objective indicia. However it first asked a series of other questions the Supreme Court did not consider in Graham. First, it asked whether it was historically constitutional to sentence a 14-year-old to life without parole. 224 To answer this question the court looked to the year 1791, when the Bill of Rights was adopted. 225 It found that juveniles as young as seven years old were "subjected to the same arrest, trial, and punishment as adult offenders."
226 It further noted that in 1855 and then again in 1885 juveniles as young as ten years old were hanged. 227 Finally, referring to the writings of William Blackstone, the court reasoned, "once a child turned 14 years old, he or she no longer benefited from the presumption of incapacity to commit a capital, or any other, felony." 228 Blackstone's widely consulted treatise, Commentaries on the Laws of England (1786) was the only text to treat the topic of punishment at the time and largely influenced the spirit of the Bill of Rights, 229 but the court fails to mention that Blackstone's England draws and quarters, beheads, burns and mutilates, 230 and thus imparts a stand-ard quite different form the one presently used by the Supreme Court. Moreover, the Supreme Court did not factor archaic standards of juvenile justice into its reasoning in Graham. Nevertheless this antiquated metric forms the basis of the state supreme court's holding, and on this discrete issue finds that "Ninham cannot establish that sentencing a 14-year-old to life imprisonment without parole was considered cruel and unusual at the time the Bill of Rights was adopted." 231 The burden falls to Ninham to demonstrate that the sentence is, however, contrary to the "evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society."
232
According to the post-Graham Supreme Court, the analysis of the evolving standards of decency, as applied in noncapital cases, incorporates the two-step process in which the court looks to the national consensus through the lens of objective indicia comprised of authorizing legislation and judicial practice which indicates frequency of imposition. The Court then looks inward to its own independent judgment. The Court's judgment, however, is not without guidelines. It is based upon three factors: a balancing test between the severity of the crime and the severity of the penalty with culpability at the fulcrum; the penological justifications of the penalty; and though not dispositive, international consensus. 233 The Court has determined that the best yardstick by which to measure the national consensus is to examine legislation. Claiming to follow suit, the Ninham court looked to legislation in its determination and found that, regarding juveniles, "44 states, the District of Columbia, and the federal government permit life without parole sentences for homicide crimes," and further, "36 of those 44 states permit life without parole sentences for offenders who were 14 years old or younger at the time of offense." 234 The Ninham court found that the punishment was authorized by legislation. 235 The Ninham court, then, pointed out that in Graham the statistical findings were similar, with 37 states and the District of Columbia permitting juvenile life without parole in non-homicide cases. 236 The Supreme Court, however, maintained in Graham that " [t] to employ it. The Ninham court instead reasoned that "rarity" of a sentence is not "necessarily demonstrative of a national consensus" and rather that it appears to be a rarely imposed sentence because not that many juveniles actually commit such "horrific and senseless" crimes. 238 On this basis, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin found that Ninham "failed to demonstrate that there is a national consensus against sentencing a 14-year-old to life imprisonment without parole for committing intentional homicide." 239 The Supreme Court does not take the metric of legislation at face value. It balances the "law on the books," or the number of states that legislatively authorize the penalty against the "law in action," or the number of states that actually impose the penalty, and how often it is imposed. 240 In the case of Ninham, the argument could have been that even though there are only six states that categorically ban LWOP for juvenile offenders convicted of homicide, the sentence itself is rarely imposed. 241 Looking at a specific block of time from 1980-2006, the FBI reports juvenile offenders committed 42,043 homicides. 242 However, in 2009 only an estimated 2,574 juveniles were serving life sentences without the possibility of parole. 243 Most likely the Court would find that the penalty, though largely authorized, is so rarely used as to make it truly unusual. Moreover,
[o]f the forty-four states which authorize life-without-parole sentences for juvenile homicide offenders, twenty-eight jurisdictions (twenty seven states and the District of Columbia) have ten or fewer persons sentenced for homicides committed as juveniles serving that sentence, while only seven states have one hundred or more persons who are serving such terms imposed for crimes committed as juveniles. 244 The Court would likely find there is no national consensus to support the use of this penalty for this class of offender based on the complex analysis of authorization and frequency of use.
Categorical Test, Step 2: Court's Independent Judgment
The Ninham court acknowledged the importance of the Supreme Court's balancing test to the formulation of its independent judgment, which looks to the severity of the crime and the severity of the punishment in light of the culpability of the offender. The court further acknowledged the finding in Thompson, where the Court determined first, that "less culpability should attach to a crime committed by a juvenile than to a comparable crime committed by an adult," and second, that the application of the death penalty to offenders 15 years old and younger does not measurably contribute to the goals that capital punishment is intended to achieve."
245
The Ninham court then cited the three differences between adults and juveniles, which were outlined in Roper, that "demonstrate that juvenile offenders cannot with reliability be classified among the worst offenders":
(1) juveniles' lack of maturity and underdeveloped sense of responsibility, which results in impulsive actions; (2) the vulnerability to which juveniles are subject often leaves them susceptible to peer pressure and the forces of their surroundings; and (3) juveniles' character is often not fully formed. 246 However, the court refused to apply Roper and Thompson to Ninham. Moreover, even though the Ninham court stated that it would follow the approach set forth in Graham, it refused to apply the Graham logic to Ninham.
a. Juvenile Culpability
The Ninham court, following Graham, turns to the question of juvenile culpability. The Ninham court does not disagree with Graham or Roper that juvenile offenders are less culpable than adult offenders. However, it nuances the question of culpability. The Ninham court asserts, "the constitutional question before us does not concern only the typical 14-yearold offender. Rather, the question before us concerns all 14-year-old offenders, typical or atypical, who commit intentional homicide."
247 It is unclear if the court considers it typical of 14-year-olds to commit homicide, or where the court is going with this logic. Furthermore, it is not clear, and the court offered no explanation, as to why it has rewritten the question thus. In fact there is a complete lacuna of explanation; it is completely absent from the court's opinion, leaving one to speculate why the court finds that 14-year-olds are not "categorically less deserving of life imprisonment without parole." 248 The court further misreads the Graham decision when it understands diminished moral culpability of juveniles sentenced to LWOP for non- homicide offenses to be, in part, dependent upon the offense. The Ninham court seems to interpret the Supreme Court to mean that determining diminished moral culpability must be a two-step process, first, the age factor; second, the offense factor. At no point does the Supreme Court, in Graham or elsewhere, find that diminished culpability depends upon both age and offense. In Atkins, Roper, Thompson, and Graham the Supreme Court finds that diminished culpability depends upon, and only upon, class of the offender (age), not the offense (homicide). Nevertheless, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin found that there was no precedent to show a juvenile who commits homicide had diminished culpability. Furthermore, the court failed to see 14-year-olds as a distinct class, "such that a different constitutional analysis applies." 249 The court based its rationale upon the presence of competing, but unnamed, studies, some of which show juveniles are "never culpable enough to deserve life imprisonment without parole" and some "psychologists" who have "promoted scientific evidence that arrives at the precise opposite conclusions." 250 Thus, the court finds that evidence on both sides of the argument simply cancels out the consideration, and that "Ninham has failed to demonstrate that 14-year-olds who commit intentional homicide cannot reliably be classified among those offenders deserving of life imprisonment without parole."
251
The Graham precedent would have required the court to look to its own independent judgment based on the three factors, mentioned, but not adhered to, in the state supreme court treatment. The first factor, the seriousness of the crime, would be extremely difficult to argue in Ninham's favor since the offense is disturbing and difficult to face. However, nowhere in Eighth Amendment CUP jurisprudence does the Court state all of the factors must be in the defendant's favor. The Court makes its assessment based on all factors taken together as they relate to each other to create a holistic picture.
The second factor is concerned with the culpability of the offender, or offender class. This is the strongest point of Ninham's case and the crux of the constitutional question it poses. Following Graham, a juvenile offender has lowered culpability, which is constitutionally sufficient, and his diminished responsibility de facto prohibits LWOP for juvenile homicide offenders for several reasons. The first is that life without parole is the most severe sentence a juvenile can suffer; therefore it cannot be applied because offenders with diminished culpability can never face the imposition of the most severe penalty. It is likely the Court would also find that a juvenile sentenced to die in prison would spend many more years there than an adult counterpart in his forties, thereby punishing the juvenile offender who has the lesser culpability with the harsher sentence. Finally, Graham reminds us that "the similarities between life with- 249 Id. 250 Id. at 473. 251 Id.
out parole sentences and death sentences, noting that the comparison is especially apparent when the sentences are imposed upon juveniles."
252
Regardless of whether the juvenile offender committed a homicide or not, he or she is still a juvenile and by that fact vastly different from the average adult offender in cognitive capacity, character development, and potential for maturation and change. As Graham noted, "developments in psychology and brain science continue to show fundamental differences between juvenile and adult minds." 253 Furthermore, a juvenile homicide offender is just as likely as a non-homicide offender to be an insufficiently functioning member of his own defense. It is highly likely the Court would find a juvenile's reduced culpability status strong enough to override any benefits of safety to individuals or society at large that the state may argue makes the sentence necessary.
b. Penological Justification
Part of the analysis of the juvenile offender's culpability is concerned with the penological justifications of the punishment. Following Graham, it seems the Court would not find the justifications of the punishment able to withstand the Eighth Amendment challenge in a case of a juvenile homicide offender. 254 First, in terms of deterrence, the same issues of immaturity that reduce the culpability of a juvenile offender also make it highly likely that a juvenile offender is not going to engage in a sophisticated cost-benefit analysis of his behavior prior to committing the crime. 255 Graham found that "[t]he heart of the retribution rationale is that a criminal sentence must be directly related to the personal culpability of the criminal offender." 256 The average juvenile's inability to complexly and comprehensively calculate into the future what it means to act in the present undermines the penological goal of deterrence. The Court further reaffirmed its holding in Roper, and found that deterrence doesn't function for juveniles in a way it might for adults because the deterrent effect of a sentence such as LWOP is outweighed by diminished culpability. 257 Moreover, the Graham Court reasoned that penological theory undergirding incapacitation depends upon an ultimate determination that the offender is absolutely beyond reform. 258 However, the Court notes that the "characteristics of juveniles make that judgment questionable." 259 juvenile's misbehavior in prison . . . the sentence of life without parole would still be disproportionate because the judgment was made at the outset, before the juvenile has a meaningful opportunity to demonstrate maturity." 260 Again, the Ninham court disregarded the Supreme Court's reasoning. In addition, Graham found that rehabilitation is undermined because there is no hope, which is a necessary component of rehabilitation, that good behavior will result in any other reality than life imprisonment, especially when the offender is a juvenile who possesses the capacity for change and maturity. 261 Retribution is, perhaps, the only argument the state could make on its behalf, but both Roper and Graham found that retribution isn't as valid a goal in terms of minors, 262 precisely because the foundation of retribution is based on the theory that the most severe retribution "must be directly related to . . . personal culpability." 263 Therefore, retribution cannot be justified when the offender has diminished culpability. The Supreme Court's line of reasoning in Graham did not, however, guide the Supreme Court of Wisconsin.
The Ninham court began and ended its analysis of the penological justifications of JLWOP in homicide cases by noting that it does not recognize Ninham as being a part of a class of offender deserving of diminished culpability because the offense is homicide. As mentioned before, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin misunderstood how the Supreme Court has typically treated "class of offender" for the purpose of determining diminished moral culpability. The Ninham court then concludes that "sentencing a 14-year-old to life imprisonment without parole for committing intentional homicide serves the legitimate penological goals of retribution, deterrence, and incapacitation." 264 
c. International Consensus
Though the Supreme Court of Wisconsin completely disregarded the international consensus, there is a long line of precedent showing that world opinion has a peripheral role in the Court's capital and noncapital case reasoning. Had the state supreme court employed a more contemporary, international opinion than Blackstone, it would have found what the Supreme Court would find if Ninham was argued before it. The Court would look to the international consensus and find that only 11 other countries legislatively authorize the imposition of LWOP for juvenile homicide offenders. 265 Among those countries only the United States and Israel actually institute the punishment. 266 Moreover, as we have seen, Israel only has seven prisoners currently serving such a sentence. Israel also incorporates a review process into its extended sentences, making the United States a lone wolf in its imposition of the sentence. 267 It is highly likely the Court would consider the international consensus showing the punishment to be cruel and unusual to be a valid indicator of a general and global evolving standard of decency that could serve to clarify the Court's analysis of the national consensus and bolster its own independent judgment that JLWOP for homicide offenders is a violation of the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against CUP.
D. Conclusion of Ninham
In sum, there is no indication in the majority's opinion in Graham that it sought to limit the Graham holding only to juveniles who had been convicted of non-homicide offenses, or that it specifically intended to exclude juveniles who had been convicted of homicide from benefitting from the Graham ruling, or its extension. In fact, it seems the Court is willing to consider that LWOP is analogous to the death penalty, that it is a long, drawn out death penalty that precludes hope of any other kind of life or rehabilitation. Even though some juveniles convicted of homicide may be unduly released on parole, a categorical ban on the sentence will ensure that no juvenile is condemned to die in prison. Moreover, a sentence that provides for periodic review of an offender does not necessitate the offender's release. It is likely the Court would consider the constitutional principle of the Eighth Amendment far more valuable and important to protect than the individual legislatures' enactments of CUP sentencing schemes for juveniles.
Conclusion
JLWOP does not ask of the Eighth Amendment what it cannot give.
The Amendment is made of stronger stuff than that and certainly bears the weight of a test like the one Ninham presents, just as it stood the test of Graham. Graham guaranteed constitutional protection to juvenile offenders serving LWOP for non-homicide cases because the basis of the issue was, and remains in Ninham, the diminished culpability of the juvenile offender. Moreover, under a categorical analysis, that diminished culpability instituted by the Supreme Court depends entirely on the class of offender and has nothing to do with the class of the offense. The shift in jurisprudence that dominates Graham, the application of a categorical test to a noncapital case, signifies the nexus of the legal and socio-ethical understanding of juveniles as distinct from adults. The genealogy of juvenile justice that began with the first reformatories and earliest juvenile courts was an attempt to address the specific and distinct needs of juveniles with the ultimate aim of rehabilitation and preparation for reentry into the community as vital and valuable members of society. The procedural gains made by Kent and Gault, despite the unintended consequences of legally equating juvenile offenders with their adult counterparts, can now be coupled with the recognition, promulgated by the early reformers, that juvenile offenders are a distinct class wholly deserving of different penological standards and praxis. With Graham, the Supreme Court assured that juvenile offenders would be guaranteed procedural safeguards as well as distinct and absolute diminished-culpability status. The Court's decision expanded the application of youth, as a mitigating factor subject to importance in sentencing schema, to become a concurrent factor important from the outset and crucial to bear in mind throughout the entire process. Graham opens the door for Ninham and all similarly situated juvenile offenders who are denied diminished culpability, subjected to the most severe penalties traditionally reserved for the worst adult offenders, and thereby denied the protection of the Eighth Amendment. Ultimately, Graham calls into question the long held belief that the answer to society's criminological ills resides in the practice of hiding behind insufferable walls a significant percentage of society's "undesirables," most of whom are poor and minorities. However, throwing away the key does nothing to address the inherent problems that plague contemporary society, and has no penologically justified basis. In the case of juvenile offenders, a life sentence with no possibility of release prematurely determines that certain human beings are without value. The Supreme Court, in Graham, rejected that dark fatalism for a gentler flame in its enlightened conviction that juveniles are an important part of our collective future, that their actions point to endemic problems in society that are not addressed by imprisonment, and that the curative for those individuals and society at large is rehabilitation rather than a long, drawn out, meaningless, tortuous, and hopeless existence unto death. What could that possibly ever improve? We are reminded of Emerson's hopeful articulation that every obstacle carries within it a solution, for "every wall is a gate." 268
